Opinion: Europe’s Last Summer

This article is an analysis and brief summary of David Fromkin’s book Europe’s Last Summer, a study of the immediate weeks leading up to World War I. I quite enjoyed this book and believe it to not have the attention it deserves. I know it is less popular than it should be since I found a 2014 library receipt between two pages; I’m the first person to finish reading my library’s copy in 9 years! To hopefully add a minor increase to the popularity of Fromkin’s work, let us discuss the arguments unveiled in this book and how they run counter to the story of the causes of WWI as we typically understand them. 

The typical analysis of the causes of World War I in middle and high schools is helpfully summarized with the acronym MAIN: Militarism, Alliances, Imperialism, and Nationalism. With this, Fromkin does not diverge. In the years prior to the start of the Great War, the armies of the Great Powers increased in size and capabilities. Alliances between Germany and Austria—along with the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain—divided the world into two camps. Colonial interests, largely in Africa and Asia, sparked competition and drove wedges between major powers. And as empires fell and nation states rose to replace them, the national identity of the average person grew. With these large principles of the causes of World War I, the general population finds concord with Fromkin in Europe’s Last Summer. These major causes were present before 1914, however, so the question has to be raised as to why it was only in the summer and fall of 1914 that these causes inspired World War I. 

In trying to find the answer to this question, Fromkin diverges from the common canon. Most people would say that Gavrilo Princip’s murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to World War I; Fromkin disagrees. Fromkin argues that the Archduke’s assassination did lead to one war, but not the Great War. In understanding the distinction being made from Fromkin, it clarifies things to understand the situation as two wars, one local and the other global. The former was between Austria and Serbia and was the direct inspiration for the latter, World War I. 

Princip’s crime gave Austria-Hungary the excuse that it had been looking for in order to fight Serbia—a desire that had been held by Vienna long before the death of the heir. Fearing that an increase in Serbia’s power would lead to Austria-Hungary losing its status as a world power, Vienna wished to eliminate Serbia as a threat. Immediately following the two Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, Vienna thought that Serbia’s weakness was at its peak and needed to be taken advantage of as soon as possible. With the death of Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary was given its opportunity. Russia, as Serbia’s protector, is normally seen to have mobilized its armies following Austria’s declaration of war against Serbia, causing Germany and then France to do the same, starting World War I. This chain of events, however, is not the story that Fromkin tells. Russia’s czar, Nicholas II, was staunchly in favor of monarchies, as kings tend to be. Since the murder of the Archduke was not denounced by Serbia and potentially aided by its government, Russia conceivably could’ve let Serbia face its punishment by Austria. Fromkin argues that the reason for why Russia was forced to protect Serbia, starting a chain of events which resulted in World War I, lies heavily in the actions of Austria’s ally, Germany. 

Prior to 1914, Germany had a fear similar to Austria about its status as a world power. With France and Russia being to the West and East of Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II was paranoid that he was surrounded by enemies and was going to be removed as a world power by the Triple Entente. Additionally, German officials had the largely unfounded belief that Germany was a country on the decline, a problem which could only be solved by war. As the power of France and Russia was only increasing, Germans believed that war between the nations was inevitable and—in order for them to win—desirable to occur as soon as possible. With this desire for war to break out in Europe, German state officials were war hawks who forced the hands of Russia, France, and England into World War I. When Russia had the chance to not support Serbia and not complete its mobilization, Germany revoked Russia’s choice by mobilizing its own forces. With German forces mobilized, Russia and France had to follow suit. To summarize Fromkin’s German argument, Germany took the local situation between Austria and Serbia and inflated it into one that involved nearly all of Europe to start the war that they believed they needed. 

In Europe’s Last Summer, Fromkin makes the argument that World War I was not sparked by Gavrilo Princip, but instead by German officials intentionally using an Austro-Serbian conflict to their own advantage. The convincingness of Fromkin’s argument is, of course, up to debate, but Europe’s Last Summer is an interesting read which offers a view counter to the norm about who and what caused World War I. 

"great-grandpa joe in world war one" by <def> is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

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